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This study addresses three questions that arise in Asia when formulating, financing, 
implementing, and maintaining transnational linkages versus purely domestic connections. 
Firstly, how is optimal economic space to be defined as a useful starting point? Secondly, 
how can relevant criteria be developed to define the emerging spatial economy and identify 
efficient transnational transport networks? Thirdly, what are the main investment 
opportunities in physical infrastructure that would result in more efficient and effective 
regional cooperation and integration (making special reference to the potential role of cross-
border special economic zones (SEZs) or their equivalents)? 
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The difficulties in determining investment priorities arise in large part from the problem of 
externalities, i.e., large divergences between private and social costs/benefits. An important 
externality that is often overlooked in a narrow domestic calculus is the costs and benefits of 
improved transnational linkages. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) rightly sees potential 
for strengthening regional social and political ties within Asia through cross-border corridor 
development as a step towards building an Asian economic community (Kuroda, 2006). 
Some would go further and suggest that regionalism is a matter of survival for Asia in a tri-
polar world alongside Europe and the United States. There may be important non-economic 
benefits of regionalism beyond raising national income and reducing poverty. Thus greater 
weight may be given to regional cooperation and regional projects than would be consistent 
with purely economic goals. 
Nevertheless, there are pitfalls in taking a partial approach to externalities. A proper calculus 
for setting investment priorities must still take account of all large externalities, not merely 
those that happen to be in current fashion (e.g. air and water pollution, and congestion). As 
the dialogue on trade liberalisation is coming to recognise, ‘behind-the-border’ externalities 
sometimes outweigh those ‘at-border’. For most international air and sea movements, main 
cities are the border and their functional efficiency or lack thereof has a great impact upon 
logistic costs. Too narrow a focus on land-border infrastructure may risk a double 
misallocation of resources stemming from neglect of both vital urban infrastructure projects 
and more modest but no less essential infrastructure in rural areas, which are the source of 
food and raw materials. Unfortunately, few countries are thorough and transparent in 
determining national infrastructure priorities and funding because of lack of data and 
expertise, opportunism, and politicking. Yet the clear evidence of endemic congestion, 
pollution, and flooding in large cities and rising real prices for food and raw materials points 
to massive diseconomies of agglomeration. 
To assess transnational externalities specifically, it is necessary first to determine the 
appropriate economic space and the emerging spatial pattern within it. Here the term 
‘appropriate’ economic space may be more apt than the static one of ‘optimal’ economic 
space. The latter is hard to apply in the situation of rapid growth and structural change 
occurring within a diverse Asian realm stretching from the Pacific Islands in the east to the 
Black Sea in the west. More important, however, is the nature of economic space. This 
should be envisaged as highly contoured with the dominant economic zones being large 
cities, which are also gateways to the wider world. These gateways are integrated with the 
international economy by flows along corridors. Where land corridors traverse international 
boundaries, they may be identified as locations for cross-border special economic zones 
(SEZs) that could enhance greater Asian regionalism.  
Within this broad policy context, this paper elaborates the characteristics of economic space 
by depicting its unbounded, uneven, sometimes discontinuous, and multidimensional 
character. Then the spatial planning tools of gateways and multimodal corridors are outlined 
and applied to Mainland Southeast Asia, Island Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. The 
efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border special economic zones are assessed in terms 
of their potential role in deepening Asian integration before contemplating the post-Kyoto 
effects of fuel pricing on the split between different transport modes.  
2. DEFINING  APPROPRIATE  ECONOMIC  SPACE 
Spatial analysts have shied away from defining optimal economic space. Roger Vickerman 
(1980: 165) states that “the search for optimality in models of spatial economies is probably 
as fruitless as that for optimality in the economies themselves” because the models are too 
restrictive or too simple. As “optimal spatial planning is not a practical proposition in ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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operational terms”, he suggests that rather than “start with the rigid framework of equilibrium” 
the task is ”to build up our picture of the spatial economy by a detailed consideration of the 
interactions and linkages between decisions and decision-makers.”  
Almost three decades later, Vickerman (2007, pers. comm. 2008) admits that there is a 
better understanding of the impact of infrastructure on regional economic cooperation, but 
his basic message is still valid: do not assume that investment in infrastructure will solve all 
problems. What Vickerman omits to say, however, is that it does not make sense to try and 
identify ‘optimality’ in the conditions of rapid growth and structural change that pertain across 
Asia. All that can be done is to determine whether a particular economic space is 
appropriate for the purpose at hand. 
National governments use cost/benefit analysis to rank spending priorities, including where 
to locate investment, what kind of investment, and how much investment. The problem is 
that the usual national calculus omits cross-border effects or externalities (spillovers) and 
underestimates the potential of trade and foreign direct investment.
1 This gives rise to a 
problem of negative externalities or spillovers.  
In large countries such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India and Indonesia, 
international spillovers are apparent only in their border areas. In smaller countries, however, 
spillovers have a proportionately larger effect. Apart from the tiny Pacific Island economies, 
this is also the case, for example, in Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia. Thus, the key 
issue is not optimality but what is appropriate to the case in question—Mainland Southeast 
Asia, Island Southeast Asia or the Pacific Islands. 
These instances are sufficient to highlight that a ‘seamless’ Asia is a long way from 
realization. Asia is not only separated by oceans and deserts, and split by different cultures 
and linguistic groups, but it is also divided by national boundaries. The boundaries are points 
at which political jurisdictions change and where international transit trade data are collected. 
They are associated with barriers to the flow of goods, not only stemming explicitly from 
tariffs and quotas, but also arising implicitly from inconsistent standards and irritations linked 
with border crossings. However, these boundaries pose obstacles to trade even where no 
formal barriers exist (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999). National boundaries also pose 
obstacles to movements of people that persist well after formal barriers to trade in goods 
have been lowered.
2 Even if we dispensed with national borders and considered trade flows 
across unbounded economic space, distinct regions of industrial specialization would still 
evolve of their own accord and exhibit a distinct centre and periphery (Fujita pers. comm., 
1999).  
Urban agglomeration is becoming increasingly important due to the globalization of the world 
economy. The process is examined as a general equilibrium analysis between 
agglomeration economies stemming from inter-firm linkages and agglomeration 
diseconomies arising from immobile factors. Specifically, Masahiko Fujita, Paul Krugman 
and Anthony Venables (1999) give special attention to the impacts of increasing returns and 
degree of interactive activity, and the effects of transport and communications costs on 
urban concentration and dispersion. As outlined in Figure 1, the main findings of their 
theoretical exercise are that tensions between centrifugal and centripetal forces shape the 
spatial economy.
3 
                                                  
1  Besides cross-border trade, opportunities exist for co-production, land-based tourism and integration of 
infrastructure services. Successful implementation requires political will and goodwill; hardware (infrastructure); 
software (streamlined competitive procedures, facilitation in cross-border movement of goods and people); and 
stronger organizations and better governance (ADB, 2005).  
2 Even the Canadian-USA border has a huge impact, although the 20:1 differences between inter-provincial 
exports in Canada reported by McCullum (1995) have been reduced. 
3  Centrifugal forces, promoting the spatial concentration of economic activity, are linkages, thick markets, 
knowledge spillovers and other pure external economies; centrifugal forces, opposing such concentration, are 
immobile factors, land rent/commuting, congestion and other pure diseconomies (Fujita, Krugman and 
Venables, 1999: 9 and 346). ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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1. The dispersion of firms arises when transport and communication costs are 
sufficiently low and immobile factors such as land and, in some cases, labor are 
important centrifugal forces.  
 
2. Structural transition from dispersion to concentration occurs when transport and 
communication costs rise to intermediate levels and firms engage in backward and 
forward linkages to create the circular logic of agglomeration (i.e., producers want to 
locate close to their suppliers and customers). 
 
3.  The re-dispersion of firms (i.e. deconcentration and decentralization) occurs when 
transport and communication costs have declined sufficiently over time to allow easy 
access to other firms and consumers, and agglomeration is no longer important due 
to lower factor prices and weaker competition. 
 
Even when transport and communications costs fall, the spatial structure marked by 
agglomeration may persist over decades due to interdependence between the locational 
decisions of firms. 
The welfare and policy implications of urban concentration and dispersion are addressed by 
Takatoshi Tabuchi (1998) after synthesizing William Alonso’s (1964) work stressing intra-city 
transport costs and Paul Krugman’s (1991) paper emphasizing inter-regional transport costs, 
Tabuchi sees agglomeration policies as being desirable in the process of urbanization, but 
unnecessary in the case of re-dispersion, which is attained without government intervention 
(see also Krugman, 1995). Where interregional transport costs are high, it follows from a 
social welfare viewpoint that dispersion is worse than agglomeration and that a 
decentralization policy, often conducted in regional planning, is not justified.  
 As Asia becomes more integrated and when critical thresholds are reached, falling transport 
costs may trigger an abrupt change in economic geography, disrupting any temporary 
equilibriums that may have been attained. As in the recently emergent PRC, shifts in 
regional specialization would be prompted, leading to the coalescence of new economic 
regions. Should transport costs fall, changes in the distribution of industry between centre 
and periphery, or a reversal of their respective positions, may occur. ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Figure 1: Agglomeration diagram showing non-linear impact of transport and 
communications development on the spatial concentration of increasing return 
sectors and interactive activities  
 
Source: Revised version of Masahisa Fujita, personal communication, 1999 
Economic space is not only unbounded but is also uneven as reflected in the concentration 
of flows in corridors between main cities; multi-dimensional in the sense that there is an 
array of air, sea, land, tele- and financial spaces that have to be integrated; and, 
discontinuous with city cores linked by telecommunications being more adjacent economic 
spaces than physical hinterlands (see Box 1). These observations underline the significance 
of urban hubs and (international) inter-city corridors. It is important not to become too 
preoccupied with cross-border land crossings and to focus on inter-city connections. Rural 
areas do not aggregate demand for airlines, container ships and telephone traffic; their place 
in the articulation of national and international networks involves the collection and 
distribution of commodities at thin densities of traffic and hence imposing only modest 
demands on infrastructure.  
In Asia the capital or main cities are the largest agglomerations of economic activity and the 
main generators of cross-border flows, primarily because market forces are irresistible and 
largely impervious to any government attempts to slow them down. A policy of re-dispersing 
activities from these cities is very difficult to promote because it runs counter to market 
forces and takes decades to realize. In short, it is seldom possible to develop a new main 
city in a place chosen by policymakers. Removal of price or investment distortions will 
correct imbalances between capital or main cities, small towns and rural areas. However, as 
illustrated by Ben Higgins and Donald Savoie (1995) in regard to Malaysia, planners have 
had little success in altering the spatial distribution of economic activity to accord with the 
stated goals of national policy. Rather than leave the location of spread effects to the market, 
letting them occur where they would without intervention, planners sought, ineffectually, to 




BOX 1 CHARACTERISTICS OF ECONOMIC SPACE 
Economic space is uneven. This is reflected in the disposition of contours and gradients on 
economic potential maps that give rise to corridors where flows converge. While every village 
is in some way connected into national transport and telecommunications systems, the 
density of flows increases markedly between towns and cities, especially between main cities. 
Most significant cross-border movements are between main cities and their ports, except in 
the case of raw materials. Corridors for the most part are inter-city flows. 
Economic space is multi-dimensional or, in conventional jargon, multimodal. However, land 
space, air space, sea space, tele space and financial space are all different dimensions. 
Collectively, they constitute what has been described as the ‘space of flows’ (Castells, 1996: 
376-428). But corridors are not necessarily multimodal or, at least, only partially so. The issue 
here is one of integration.  
Economic space may also be discontinuous but this phenomenon is not so widely 
acknowledged. Telecommunications not only transcend economic space but also bring the 
business cores of major cities into instantaneous contact. As shown, the spatial outcome is 
that these essentially similar city-cores are stacked pancake-like on top of each other (see 
Dick and Rimmer, 2003: 343). In some respects, the cores of Bangkok, Beijing, Hong Kong, 
Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Singapore and Tokyo are more adjacent economic spaces 
than their physical hinterlands. 
 
 
Instantaneous telecommunications between city-cores has produced a ‘pancake-like’ structure (Source: Based 
on Dick and Rimmer, 2003: 343).  
 ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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These observations do not mean that all available resources should be poured into capital or 
main cities.
4 The proposition reflects that on the whole capital or main cities, with the 
exceptions of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, suffer from public underinvestment. Private 
investment has been focused on shopping malls rather than infrastructure (Rimmer and 
Dick, 2008). Many cities have had no major infrastructural additions since the colonial era, 
and the city and its networks have been overwhelmed by the consequences of rapid 
economic growth. The history of the world suggests that urbanization goes in tandem with 
industrialization. 
The capital or main cities in Asia have coalesced with industrialization. Since the 1980s 
industrialization has shifted the economic centre of gravity away from extensive agricultural 
hinterlands to the main cities (Dick and Rimmer, 2003). Since then the immediate hinterland 
and associated economies of agglomeration have transformed the main cities into extended 
metropolitan regions typified by Greater Bangkok, Greater Jakarta and Greater Manila. Not 
only are these mega-city regions once again closely linked with the world economy but they 
are much less dependent on their agricultural hinterlands, becoming the new enclaves. In 
turn, the main cities are also the gateways that may constitute a high proportion of national 
economies (e.g. Bangkok in Thailand, Manila in the Philippines and Kuala Lumpur in 
Malaysia) and are the focus of multimodal corridors. 
3.  GATEWAYS AND MULTIMODAL CORRIDORS 
Gateways and multimodal corridors are the building blocks for creating an Asian spatial 
economy in which competitiveness is advanced by efficient, safe and secure transport 
systems that support the region’s success in the rapidly changing world of international 
commerce. Essentially, gateways and multimodal corridors are major systems of marine, 
road, rail, and air transportation infrastructure of regional significance for international 
commerce located within a defined geographical zone (see Box 2 and Annex). They are 
discussed here by reference to cross-border infrastructure derived from bilateral or 
multilateral cooperative agreements designed to strengthen regional connectivity by 
broadening economic opportunities between countries in Mainland Southeast Asia, Island 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, to permit greater accessibility to resources, 
technology, and knowledge (Kuroda, 2006: 1).  
Gateways have been added in Figure 2 to the seven multimodal transport corridors identified 
by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO, 2007) as reflecting Japanese business 
interests in Mainland Southeast Asia and Island Southeast Asia: Singapore-Bangkok, 
Bangkok-Hanoi, Bangkok-Yangon, Bangkok-Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi-Hong 
Kong/Guangzhou, Singapore-Jakarta and Bangkok-Manila. Three other corridors that are 
key to an understanding of the regional economies have been added: the Bangkok-
Kunming-Hanoi corridor, the Singapore-Manila corridor, and the Singapore-Hong Kong, 
China corridor. Conversely, gateways and multimodal corridors have less currency in 
planning frameworks designed to develop regional integration between the island economies 
of the Pacific through the provision of cross-border transport and communications 
infrastructure. 
                                                  
4 The issue is how to balance urban and rural investments. Urban is not necessarily bad, rural necessarily good. 
In Australia much money has been wasted on unnecessarily fine rural roads in the vastness of Western 
Australia when only in 2010 is a dual highway nearing completion between the two main agglomerations of 




BOX 2 GATEWAYS AND MULTIMODAL CORRIDORS 
Gateways and multimodal corridors need to be distinguished from modal corridors and 
hubs  
A modal corridor is provided by a single mode. Generally, goods and people move by 
sea, inland waterway, air, rail, or road corridors and information by telecommunications 
corridors. 
A hub is an articulation point offering intra-modal connections that permit transfers and 
transhipments (e.g. seaport, river port, airport, rail terminal, road depot or teleport). 
Establishing an efficient hub-transport corridor network is a key element in the 
development of both on-the-ground and air-based systems. In examining linear ground-
based systems with defined end-points, a large area needs to scanned, as illustrated by 
Australia’s East Coast Transport Corridor scoping study (AG, 2001), to identify possible 
rail corridors offering the most direct connection between hubs of high existing and 
projected demand with provision for intra-modal facilities. Where transport corridors 
traverse borders, they become bi or tri-national trade channels for which various cross-
border interests group together to develop or consolidate the infrastructure. 
The integration of these separate systems of hubs and modal corridors requires 
definitions of gateways and multimodal corridors. 
A gateway is a multimodal entry or exit point (i.e. a collection of hubs) through which 
goods and international passengers move beyond local and regional markets. Its 
intermodal function is to articulate the regulation of movements of people and goods 
through gateways. 
A multimodal corridor (or belt) is a linear orientation of international passenger and freight 
flows that connect gateways to major markets. Multimodal corridor structure differs 
according to what is moving.  
Thus gateways are the nodes and multimodal corridors the edges through which flows 
are directed within transport networks connecting supply locations and markets in 
regions with demand. Key gateway and multimodal corridor elements are: the scale and 
efficiency of port/airport infrastructure and capacity; multimodal corridor capacity within 
the urban area and from gateway to market; combined gateway-multimodal corridor 
reliability; system design for reducing life cycle cost by eliminating steps in the handling 
of goods through the network; and information systems linking gateways and multimodal 
corridor operators.  
With the globalization of markets and the emergence of complex production networks 
and multi-step supply chains, gateways and multimodal corridors have become important 
components of integrated logistics systems aimed at creating the highest level of 
customer satisfaction by managing global value-added activities. Corresponding 
institutional frameworks, supported by service providers, seek to optimize the efficient 
flow and storage of freight, and facilitate both people and related information movements 
within this logistics corridor. Both metropolitan congestion and border crossings are 
impediments to the efficient operation of the logistics corridors. 
Often the term economic corridor is used where the gateway, multimodal corridor and 
logistics corridor strategies are integrated into packages of long-term investment 
measures that seek to redistribute vibrant economic development.
  The redistribution 
process is so designed that development is not concentrated in gateway cities but spread 
along the route to encompass smaller cities and rural areas.  Attention here is centred on 
the initial prerequisite — the availability of the physical infrastructures of transport and 
telecommunications provided by the gateways and multimodal corridors (i.e. the ‘space’ 
of places) — rather than on elaborating either the institutional framework for logistics 
corridors or the economic corridors that underpin the regional planning framework 
designed to facilitate competitiveness in international trade. ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Figure 2: Gateways and multimodal corridors in Southeast Asia ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Across Mainland Southeast Asia, comprising Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet 
Nam,  inter-city corridors involve dense flows of air passengers and freight; 
telecommunications; and financial transfers. In some cases, there is also busy sea traffic by 
container ships. There is minimal cross-border land traffic to match that between Kuala 
Lumpur and Singapore, which is only a four-hour journey (Table 1). Road and rail 
connections between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok allow busy cross-border traffic, but mainly 
to and from southern Thailand, which is closer to Peninsular Malaysia than the Thai capital.  
Table 1 Door-To-Door Inter-City Transport in Mainland Asia, 2006 
          
Route Land  transport  Sea  transport  Remarks 
 km  day  cost  day  cost   
     US$    US$   
          
Singapore/Kuala 
Lumpur-Bangkok 
1,550  3  1,673  6  1,360  10t truck & 20ft 
container, excluding 
customs 
Bangkok-Yangon  945  3  730  30  1130  10t truck & 20ft 
container, excluding 
customs 
Bangkok-HCMC  913  2  1,390  2-3  560  10t truck & 20ft 
container, excluding 
customs 
          
Guangzhou-Hanoi  1,190  2  3,000  4-6  560  40ft container including 
customs 
HCMC-Hanoi  1,600  3-4  1,200  4-6  750  40ft container domestic 
cargo 
Bangkok-Hanoi (East-
West route via 
Savannakhet and 
Dongha) 
1,555  3-4  4,200  10-15  2,000  40ft container including 
customs 
Bangkok-Hanoi (North-
South route via 
Mekong and Kunming) 
2719  6  n.a,  10-15 2000  
          
Note: In 2006 the cost per ton from Hanoi to Kunming was US$270; the cost per TEU from Haiphong to Kunming was 
US$1579 (Banomyong, 2007). 
Sources: Banomyong, 2007; JETRO, 2007 and JICA, 2007. 
Improved cross-border access has not created new economic corridors comparable to 
Singapore-Kuala Lumpur-Bangkok, but generated some prosperity in what used to be 
remote up-country zones (Table 1).
5 This is especially true of northern Thailand, Laos and 
southwest PRC as part of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). For political reasons, 
Myanmar has only partially shared in these opportunities through the flood of refugees into 
northern Thailand, thereby creating a plentiful supply of cheap labor. Nevertheless, Chiang 
Mai as the main urban focus of the region is still a city of less than 0.5 million people and the 
urban planning area of the Chinese border city of Jinghong, has a population of only 135,000 
(UN Habitat/ADB, 2005).
6  
On the Thai-Malaysian border better cross-border infrastructure has helped to maintain 
some level of prosperity in the troubled southern Thai provinces which would otherwise have 
                                                  
5 ADB (2005: 18) defines an “economic corridor as a well-defined geographical area centered on a transport 
corridor integrated with the development of other infrastructure and economic activities through planned and 
systematic project, policy, and institutional interventions”. 
6 Jinghong is the capital of Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan province, PRC with a provincial 
population of 376,000 (including Jinhong). ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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continued to suffer from their remoteness from their administrative and economic centre of 
Bangkok. This is not a new phenomenon because Penang has always extended its 
economic hinterland into southern Thailand, facilitated early in the twentieth century by the 
completion of cross-border rail connections (Dick and Rimmer, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
main southern city of Hat Yai, despite its economic potential, still has a population of only 
363,000.
7  
Land traffic between Bangkok and Yangon, Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion is sparse at this stage due to the mountainous topography and lack of 
road development (Table 1). Sea traffic is still by far the cheapest way of moving cargo door-
to-door, except for valuable airfreight. In the long run, most benefit will be derived from 
improved road transport to Yangon because the sea route from the Gulf of Thailand is a long 
way round. The benefit is less obvious for Ho Chi Minh City because the sea route from 
Bangkok to this significant and rapidly growing economic hub is more direct, taking two–
three days door-to-door by ship compared with two days by road (JETRO, 2007). Ho Chi 
Minh City has a more vibrant economy than Yangon and the improvement in land transport 
could help Phnom Penh to develop into more than an economic outpost, particularly with the 
attractive back haul rates on offer. Sometimes key elements of domestic infrastructure may 
yield a higher social return (e.g., an upgraded highway between Ho Chi Minh City and 
Hanoi), though trade-offs with alternative investments may be difficult to discern because of 
the lack of clarity in national priorities. 
Most discussions on the Greater Mekong Subregion focus on the Bangkok-Hanoi land 
connection. Despite the establishment of logistics operations between Guangzhou in 
southern PRC and Hanoi, the rival alternative Bangkok-Hanoi routes have yet to attract 
regular commercialized trucking operations. Following the completion of the Second Mekong 
International Bridge between Savannakhet and Mukdahan, the East-West route via Dongha, 
favoured by the Japanese government to connect the country’s affiliated companies in 
Thailand with their counterparts in Viet Nam, has reduced door-to-door transit time between 
Bangkok and Hanoi by road from four to three days compared with 10–15 days by sea 
(Table 1). Yet, according to Masami Ishida (2007), the roundabout North-South Route via 
Kunming, preferred by the Chinese government, seems to have better prospects for road 
transport between Bangkok and Hanoi/Haiphong due to the route’s higher population, 
density, and gross regional product. Even when one or both of these routes have 
commercialized trucking services, sea transport will still maintain its advantage in bulk 
transport.  
Island Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands as a contiguous geographic region may be 
separated into five distinct zones (Fig. 3). First is the economic core, forming a corridor of 
dense traffic situated between West Malaysia, Singapore and Java. This corridor contains 
four main cities (Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta and Surabaya) and has a combined 
population of around 150 million (2005). The western side of Peninsular Malaysia is well 
articulated, although there are still political issues to be resolved between Malaysia and 
Singapore in facilitating road and rail traffic across the two bridges. In the absence of a land 
corridor between Singapore and Java there is dense air and sea traffic. On the island of 
Java itself, however, land traffic is greatly handicapped by a highly inefficient rail network 
and a very incomplete Trans-Java Tollway System. 
                                                  
7The Greater Hat Yai-Songkla Metropolitan Area has a registered population of almost 713,000, but an estimated 




Figure 3: Spatial structures of Island Southeast Asia and the Pacific 
The second zone, encompassing the huge, resource rich island of Sumatra, has enormous 
potential to link in more closely with the economies of West Malaysia, Singapore, and Java, 
but awaits the completion of a reliable all-weather trans-Sumatran highway and the 
resolution of cross-border trade facilitation issues, including flows of illegal labor migrants. 
Some of that potential has been recognized in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth 
Triangle (IMT-GT) linking northern Sumatra with northern Malaysia and southern Thailand. 
But in fact the prime international orientation of the rich Sumatra province continues to be 
towards Singapore. On the similarly resource-rich islands of Kalimantan, all-weather roads 
are now allowing a modest degree of cross-border traffic between East Malaysia and 
Indonesian Kalimantan, but here the economic potential is constrained by low population 
densities and low resource endowments. 
The third zone is the Philippines, which divides into three sub-zones. The main island of 
Luzon, which in economic terms is not much more than Greater Manila, has a strong sea 
and air traffic orientation to Hong Kong, southern PRC, Taipei,China and Japan, and a 
lesser connection by the same modes to Singapore. The second zone comprising the 
Central Philippines archipelago is focused on Cebu City and, to a lesser extent, Iloilo City. 
The big resource-rich island of Mindanao is the third sub-zone. The problem with the 
economic development of Mindanao is its distance from Manila and the thirty-five year 
Muslim insurrection. The Philippines has been more successful than Indonesia in building 
land bridges between the islands connecting to roll-on roll-off and fast ferries. Nevertheless, 
domestic economic integration will be held back until there is some settlement of the Muslim 
rebellion so that Mindanao can be developed to its full potential and a solid economic axis be 
created between Greater Manila, Cebu, and Mindanao. ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Considerable political and agency effort has gone into the development of the Brunei 
Darussalam Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) region 
(Cooney, 2007). This region links Brunei, North Sulawesi and East Kalimantan (Indonesia), 
Sabah (Malaysia), and Mindanao (Philippines). The hope has been that an open cross-
border region would help to overcome the locational and developmental disadvantage of 
these remote parts of all three countries. In practice, the region has lacked any core or any 
fundamental rationale. The insurrection in Mindanao, ongoing tensions over unofficial labor 
migration from Indonesia and the Philippines to East Malaysia, plus the age-old smuggling 
trade in the same direction, hamper efforts at integration. In other words, the liveliest 
economic potential consists precisely in those activities which governments seek to restrict. 
It is not apparent that lack of infrastructure is the critical constraint upon the much-needed 
economic development of this region. 
The fourth zone comprising the vast expanse of Eastern Indonesia, the least developed part 
of Indonesia, presents a more intractable challenge. Except on the large islands of Sulawesi 
and the West Papua, there is very little scope for land-based communications and no 
alternative to air and sea transport. Sparse populations and low labor productivity rule out 
the development of manufacturing centers so that, except for pockets of resource 
exploitation or tourism, out-migration is the best prospect for economic advancement. 
Container movements by sea, a key indicator of the pace of economic development, in 2006 
totaled only an estimated 230,000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) for this zone, about 
the same as the estimated 220,000 TEUs for the Pacific Islands (Table 2). These tiny 
volumes of traffic may be compared with 8.8 million TEUs for Mainland Southeast Asia and 
42 million TEUs for Island Southeast Asia’s Zone 1 (1.9 million TEUs for Zone 2, and 3.4 
million for Zone 3).  ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Table 2: Throughput Of Southeast Asia And Pacific Islands Ports Ranked In World 
Container Port Traffic League, 2006 
          
 Rank  TEUs   Rank  TEUs 
   thous     thous 
        





  Zone 2 Western 
Indonesia and Malaysia 
Outside Urban Corridor 
  
Laem Chabang  21  4,123 Penang  96  850 
Bangkok 67  1,451 Belawan  191  304 
Ho Chi Minh  42  2,328 Bintulu  241  192 
Haiphong 147  464 Kuching  269  152 
Cai Lan  291  113 Muara  n.r.  131 
Qui Nhon  347  54 Kuantan  281  125 
Da Nang  n.r.  36 Pontianak  334  66 
Sihanoukville 226  221 Sibu  346  54 
Sub-total   8,790 Rajang  349  53 
   Kota  Kinabalu n.a.  n.a. 
   Sub-total   1927 
        
ISLAND SE ASIA        
Zone 1 Urban 
Corridor 
  Zone 3 Philippines    
Singapore   1  24,792 Manila  34  2,722 
Jurong 102  816 Davao  205  258 
Port Klang  16  6,326 Cagayan de Oro  247  178 
Tanjung Pelapas  19  4,770 General Santos  302  97 
Pasir Gudang  94  881 Iloilo  316  84 
Tanjung Priok  25  3,280 Zamboanga  341  60 
Tanjung Perak  n.r.  1,059 Subic Bay  n.r.  35 
Sub-total   41,924 Cebu  n.a.  n.a. 
   Sub-total   3,434 
    
   Zone 4 Eastern 
Indonesia 
  
     Makkasar  n.a.  n.a. 
     Bitung  n.a. n.a. 
         
     Zone 5 Pacific Islands    
     Apra  (Guam)  n.r.  82 
     Noumea  n.r.  75 
     Papeete  335  65 
     Pago  Pago  n.a.  n.a. 
     Port  Moresby  n.a.  n.a. 
     Suva  n.a.  n.a. 
     Sub-total   222 
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In the fifth zone of the Pacific Islands, the development challenges mirror those of Eastern 
Indonesia over an even wider area and sparser populations (World Bank, 2006; ADB, 
2007a). Papua New Guinea is the only landmass in the South Pacific where land-based 
transport has potential to integrate urban centres. Port Moresby, its capital, is the largest 
centre in the Pacific Islands, with a population of almost 300,000 (Table 3). Beyond Papua 
New Guinea, Greater Suva, the capital of Fiji, has a population of 225,000 and only the main 
island of Viti Levu has seen any development of manufacturing (mainly textiles), but this has 
been undermined recently by political turmoil.  
Table 3 Capital City Populations For Pacific Island Countries, 2007 
    
Capital City  Country  Population 
   thous 
    
    
Port Moresby  Papua New Guinea  299 
Greater Suva  Fiji 224 
Noumea New  Caledonia  156 
Hagåtña Guam  149 
Papeete French  Polynesia  131 
Honiara Solomon  Islands  66 
Apia Samoa  43 
Port Vila  Vanuatu  40 
Nuku'alofa Tonga 25 
Palikir  Federated States of Micronesia  7 
    
Source: UNS, 2008 
For the rest of the South Pacific, natural resource development and tourism are therefore the 
limits of economic potential (COA. 2006). Economic improvement for individuals and their 
families depends heavily on out-migration to and remittances from Australia and New 
Zealand. Tourism and labor flows sustain a basic network of air traffic. A daily flight 
connection (i.e., five or more per week) is not only the minimum level of accessibility for 
business people but also a very good indicator of proximity to or remoteness from the 
economic cores of the international economy (Fig. 4). Only Apia, Guam, Honiara, Nadi, 
Noumea, Papeete, Port Moresby, Port Vila, Rarotonga, and Nuku’alofa on this score have 
daily flights through to Auckland, Brisbane, Cairns, Fukuoka, Los Angeles, Manila, 
Melbourne, Nagoya, Osaka, Paris, Seoul, Sydney or Tokyo (Table 4). Some direct 
international shipping services have been mostly replaced by feeders to and from smaller 
ports ‘hubbing’ on local trans-shipment centers, notably Auckland for the South Pacific and 
Guam for Micronesia (ADB, 2007a). The problems of domestic passengers and goods 
movements, which for the most part involve collection and distribution to and from their tiny 
capital ‘cities’, are almost intractable because of the minuscule scale combined with 
institutional failure. Governments can readily be criticized for poor investment decisions and 
stifling regulation, but it is unlikely without massive subsidies that private sector investment 
will be forthcoming on anything like the necessary scale. ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Figure 4: Fights per average working day from the Pacific Islands. 
 
The eastwards transition across the five zones from Island Southeast Asia to the Pacific 
highlights the benefits and the limitations of a development and infrastructure policy 
conceived in terms of gateways and multimodal corridors. There is a progressive switch from 
the well-developed multimodal inter-city corridor, stretching from Medan/Penang via Kuala 
Lumpur, Singapore and Jakarta to Surabaya, through the resource rich areas of Sumatra 
and Kalimantan, the three key sub-zones in the Philippines, and the vast zone of Eastern 
Indonesia to the islands of the South Pacific where there are no multimodal corridors at all. 
These differences are of crucial importance in considering the efficiency and effectiveness of 
SEZs and their role in regional cooperation and integration (ADB, 2007b). ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Table 4: Flights Per Average Working Day, March-April, 2008 
                
  Pacific Islands Airports   
    APW GUM HIR NAN NOU PPT POM VLI RAR TBU
       
AKL  Auckland  1  —— 4 —— — —   1 1
BNE  Brisbane —  — 21 —— 2 — — —
CNS  Cairns —  — — — — — 2 — — —
FUK  Fukuoka —  1 ————— —  —  —
LAX  Los 
Angeles 
— — — 2 — 4 ——  —  —
MNL  Manila —  1 — — — — — —  —  —
MEL  Melbourne — — — 1 —— — —  —  —
NGO  Nagoya —  1 ————— —  —  —
OSA  Osaka —  2 ————— —  —  —
PAR  Paris —  — — — — 1 — —  —  —
SEL  Seoul —  2 ————— —  —  —
SYD  Sydney —  — — 21 —— —  —  —
TOK  Tokyo —  4 — — 1 — — 1  — —
                
Note: Pacific Islands Airports — APW Apia, GUM Guam, HIR Honiara, NAD Nadi, NOU Noumea, PPT Papeete, POM 
Port Moresby, VLI Port Vila, RAR Rarotonga, and TBU Nuku’alofa 
Source: OAG (2008).  
4.  SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 
Since the establishment of the original export processing zone in Kaohsiung, Taipei,China, 
in 1965, much hope has been invested in special economic zones (SEZ) (or their 
equivalents such as the existing free ports of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Penang in 
Malaysia) as ways of bypassing the constraints of poor infrastructure and weak governance 
in many Asian-Pacific countries (Kuchiki, 2006; ESCAP, 2007). Although Penang lost its free 
port status in 1969, free-trade zones were established there in 1971 following a Malaysian 
trade mission to Taipei,China and subsequently dispersed throughout the country. In 
particular, these Malaysian export enclaves, like those in Taipei,China, were used not only to 
compensate for infrastructure deficiencies but also to adopt flexible policies targeting 
multinational companies in the electronics industry (Table 5). Since the 1980s, SEZs, typified 
by Shenzhen in PRC, have proliferated in Asia as catalysts for economic reform and 
alleviating poverty. While fostered by local or provincial governments, they have been 
subject to central government intervention to attract multinational anchor firms. Now these 
SEZ-style policies are being promoted as an instrument to strengthen the impact of cross-
border transport and communications infrastructure, particularly in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion, together with the construction of domestic transport infrastructure and agricultural 
development. 
 ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Table 5: Export Processing Zones In Asia, 2006 
              









 No.  No.  Thous  %  US$mn  No.  US$mn  % 
              







40,000 —  17.0bn  43,360  145.1bn  59 
Hong Kong   —  IE 
CP 
SP 
  336  —  29.6bn  3,845  101.5bn  — 
Japan —  2(OSFTZ)  200  —  965  77  —  43 
Macao  —  IP  131  — 5.5bn  3,100 2.7bn  80 
Mongolia —  1(TZ) 
12(EDZ) 
— —  — —  —  — 
Taipei, 
China 
5(EPZ_ IIPC 68  —  24,629  354  343  — 
South  Korea  —  3FEZ  39  70 11.6bn  — 30.6bn    — 
Cambodia  3(EPZ)  — 200 —  — —  —  — 
Indonesia —  Bonded 
zone 
6,000   11.3bn  1,149 18.4bn  — 
Malaysia 13(FIZ)  200  491  54  5.5bn  3,000  12.6bn  83 
Philippines 4(public) 
41(private) 
31 1,128  74 1.3bn  1,179  32.0bn  60 
Thailand  10(EPZ) 22(GIZ)  452  — 1.4bn  1,367 8,242   
Singapore 7(EPZ)  35(IP)  —  —  6,400  7,000  166  — 
Viet Nam  10(EPZ)  8(IZs) 
173(other) 
950 45  1,067  234  —  80-100 
Bangladesh 8(EPZ)  5341  188  85  1.035  252  11,717  76 
India  — 8(SEZ)  101  32 8.0bn 811 4.9bn  — 
Maldives  —  EEZ  88 —  — —  —  48 
Nepal  1(EPZ)  — —  — —  — —  — 
Pakistan  22(EPZ)  4(IZ)  888  — 3,872 300 8,073  — 





388 —  17,089 — 413  — 
              
Notes: BECZ Border and Economic Cooperation Zone; COC Chamber of Commerce; CP Cyber Port; EEZ Exclusive 
Economic Zone; EPZ Export Processing Zone; ETDZ Economic and Technology Development Zone; FEZ Free 
Economic Zone; FIZ Free Industrial Zone; FTZ Free Trade Zone; HIDZ Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone; IE 
Industrial Estate; IIPC International Information Products Companies; IP Industrial Park; IZ Industrial Zone; OSFTZ 
Okinawa Special Free Trade Zone; SEZ Special Economic Zone; SP Science Park; THR Tourist and Holiday Resort; 
TIZ Taipei,China Investment Zone; TZ Trade Zone. 




Some SEZs in Asia have achieved rapid employment growth, especially for women, 
increased exports, and boosted skills and technology transfer.
8 However, SEZs are not a 
panacea for all problems as there have been failures manifest in low net exports, poor 
linkages, unclear cost/benefit structures, administrative barriers and social issues (including 
providing a cover for corrupt and illegal business practices).
9 Akinci (2006) has attributed 
these failures to public sector development, uncompetitive policies, lack of integrated 
development procedures and controls, and inadequate institutional infrastructure (see also 
World Bank Group, 2008). The importance of location as an independent variable was not 
considered in evaluating the mixed track record of SEZs. 
The most profitable locations for SEZs in Asia have been found in the immediate hinterlands 
of global gateways (Fig. 5).
10 Proximity to gateways has been a key factor in the efficiency 
and effectiveness of SEZs in the Pearl River Delta; the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore 
Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) linking Singapore with the Indonesian provinces of West Sumatra 
and Riau and the Malaysian state of Johor; the Lower Yangtze ‘economic zone’; and the 
emerging Seoul-Incheon-Gaesung triangle. Usually, gateway cities are also the most 
valuable component of the national market; the largest market for skilled labour; have the 
most frequent national and international transport connections; have the most accessible 
information and the cheapest search costs (Rimmer and Dick, 2009). All these factors 
generate externalities leading to increasing returns to scale.  
New special economic mega-zones (SEMZ) are emerging to overcome the traditional 
enclave-like character of SEZs and accommodate the trend towards global production 
networks.
11 Their emergence as logistics hubs makes proximity to global gateways an even 
more fundamental locational criterion. Featuring integrated mixed land use activities, these 
satellite mega-zones combine airport, seaport, new town, tourism, utilities, industrial park 
and commerce under a single authority (Rimmer, 2004a). Employing either public-private 
partnerships or private developer approaches, the mega-zones, typified by Incheon FEZ 
(Rimmer 2004b) and Dubai Logistics City (DLC), are set within a revamped regulatory 
framework offering investors supply chain competitiveness and superior locational 
advantages, plus government compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and 
International Labour Organization (ILO) commitments.
12 
The archetypal SEZ, on which the special economic mega-zone is based, is not Kaohsiung’s 
pure economic platform but Shenzhen, which owed its initial location to proximity to the 
global gateway of Hong Kong, China. The subsequent success of Shenzhen, with a current 
                                                  
8   Reportedly, the SEZs have worked well in Taipei,China, South Korea, China and Viet Nam, where 
governments wanted a high degree of control over how their economies opened, but have been less 
successful in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, where the addition of a few square kilometers of plants 
and roads have not reversed the overall effect of the economy (Adams, 2007).  
9  Woodbridge (2008) reports that SEZs play a role in the trans-shipment and transit of counterfeit goods, 
prompting the International Trade Association (ITA) to urge government intervention to halt this traffic. 
10 Akinci (2006) defines an SEZ as an integrated development, over 100 km2 in area, having no typical location, 
with multi-use eligible activities, and serving domestic, internal and export markets. 
11   According to Akinci (2006), this trend is associated with the increasing importance of supply chain 
management, outsourcing, the rise of value-added services, the switch from supply driven to consumer 
relationships; development of integrated clusters, and the co-location of sales and manufacturers to attract 
integrated manufacturing clusters. Also, Akinci sees the special economic mega-zone reflecting the policy 
trends towards global integration through the World Trade Organization (WTO), deepening of regional trade 
blocs, harmonization of taxes and investment rules, liberalization of telecommunications and IT sectors, and 
enhanced trade and supply chain security.  
12  The WTO requires SEZs to phase out their export-subsidy component by 2010 in conformity with the 
provisions of its Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement adopted during the 
Uruguay round between 1986 and 1994 (Woodbridge, 2008). Only the poorest WTO members (i.e. under 
US$1000 per capita) will be able to offer duty-free import an export rights in a SEZ. Making these adjustments 
will primarily apply to manufacturing-based SEZs rather than those with strong commercial or logistics 
elements.  ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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population of around 9 million (including floating residents), allowed the SEZ to open up its 
own container port terminals (Yantian, Chiwan, and Shekou) and Shenzhen Bao’an 
International Airport. Although Shenzhen is fourth in the world league of container ports, the 
second ranking Hong Kong, China continues to serve as the main global gateway. 
Moreover, Hong Kong, China with Guangzhou fulfils this role in relation to other zones in the 
Pearl River Delta. Shenzhen was not chosen in isolation but selected to maximize its 
locational advantages. In drawing lessons from Shenzhen and its PRC counterparts for 
India, Chee Kian Leong (2007) attributes the resultant increased economic growth not to the 
sheer number of SEZs, but to the greater scale of liberalization. 
In Southeast Asia, unlike PRC, most countries have only one international gateway. There is 
really no choice as to where SEZs are located due to inefficient inland freight distribution in 
the Asian-Pacific Region. Unlike the West Coast of North America, where an efficient inland 
distribution system permits the dispersion of equivalent activities to new and larger cities, the 
quality of economic space in Asia decays rapidly as one moves beyond the metropolitan 
region. As reflected in Thailand, 80% of the country’s 50 industrial estates/parks/zones are 
within 150 minutes of Bangkok (BOI, 2008); similarly in Viet Nam there is a proliferation of 
SEZs in and around Ho Chi Minh City (Runckel, 2008). However, the real issue is not where 
to locate a SEZ but how to make the mega-cities more efficient in themselves. This is the 
challenge of both infrastructure and governance. In terms of optimal investment, the highest 
yielding returns are in relieving the constraints of urban infrastructure. Otherwise, improved 
national and international infrastructure links are simply delivering more traffic faster into a 
worsening bottleneck. The real SEZs are the cities themselves and that is where the focus 
should be. 
In contrast, some non-gateway locations (inland industrial clusters) identified in Figure 6 are 
being earmarked for SEZs and some inland logistics parks developed as components of 
regional development strategies to bolster the impact of transport infrastructure development 
in the border areas of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam (Table 6).
13 The 
reduction of institutional barriers through the GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreement 
(CBTA) are projected “to induce the growth of local traffic along border crossing routes as 
well as demand shifts from air and maritime transport” (JICA, 2007: 8).
14 Nevertheless, some 
non-gateway locations are likely to impose higher overall unit costs for non-agricultural and 
non-resource developments, place some SEZ firms at a competitive disadvantage, and 
provide serious obstacles to dreams of efficient decentralized locations.  
The apparent need for cross-border infrastructure may in large part be a product of the 
artificial ‘distortions’ created by national policy regimes. Genuine economic integration has 
occurred in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) where ‘Greater’ 
Singapore forms an urban hub, constituting a cross-border connection in a central location. 
While Batam and Bintan Islands in Indonesia provide both labour for manufacturing firms 
and land for golf, there is nevertheless, at the same time, a thriving business attracting 
cross-border patrons for gambling, prostitution and cheaper liquor. 
                                                  
13 The SEZs in Cambodia are designed to develop islands of good governance as a shortcut towards attracting 
foreign investment where reforms to legal systems and the construction of infrastructure nationwide are tardy 
(Adams, 2007). 
14 The 2003 CMTA is a multilateral instrument designed to facilitate the cross-border movements of people and 
goods within the GMS. Specifically, it provides on designated routes for: “(i) single stop inspection; (ii) cross-
border movement of persons (including visas for those engaged in transport operations; (iii) transit traffic 
regimes, including exemptions from physical customs inspection; (iv) bond deposit, escort, and agriculture and 
veterinary inspection; (v) requirements that road vehicles will have … to be eligible for cross-border traffic; (vi) 
exchange of commercial traffic rights; and (vii) infrastructure, including road and bridge design standards, road 
signs and signals (Kuroda, 2006: 13). ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Figure 5: Location of subregions in East Asia 
 
Source: Based on Rimmer, 2004a 
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Figure 6: Location of existing and proposed Special Economic Zones in the cross-
border areas of the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
 
 
Source: Based on Vilmolsiri, 2007 ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Table 6: Major Regional Developments Proposed For Border Areas In Mainland 
Southeast Asia 
 
      
Country SEZ  Adjacent 
country 
Notes 
      
      
Cambodia Manhattan 
(Bavet) 
Viet Nam  Cheap labour force 
available in Cambodia 
Some infrastructure 
installed from Thailand 
and Viet Nam 
 Chhay  Chhay 
(Poipet) 
Thailand 
 Koh  Kong    Thailand 
 Sihanoukville  n.a. 






Thailand  Many people from 
Myanmar working in Mae 
Sot, Thailand 
Thailand  Chiang Rai  Border area  
 
Coordinate with Yunnan 
Province (China), Lao 
PDR and Myanmar 
 Mukdahan-
Savannakhet
Laos Coordinate  with  Savan-
Seno
  Trat-Koh Kong  Cambodia  Coordinate with Koh 
Kong 
 Myanmar  Myanmar  Coordinate  with 
Myawadi-Mae Sot 
Viet Nam  Lao Bao  n.a.  First SEZ in Viet Nam 
  Moc Bai  Cambodia  Coordinate with 
Manhattan 
      
Note: n.a. not applicable. 
Source: JICA, 2007; Takeuchi, 2007; Vimolsiri, 2007. 
A range of identical or similar activities, according to Andrew Walker (1999), underpin the 
apparent economic potential of cross-border, twin-town SEZs and may, in large part, be a 
function of cumbersome and distorting policy regimes (e.g., counterfeiting, gemstones, illegal 
migration, logging and ‘smuggling’). For example, in the case of SEZs on the Myanmar-
Thailand ‘border’, the likely outcomes are that refugee Burmese labour ends up on the Thai 
side and firms on the Myanmar side engage in activities that are illegal in Thailand. If the aim 
of cross-border SEZs is to by-pass irksome regulations this is a good way of undermining 
national policy. However, Harry G. Johnson (1965) argued forcefully that distortions should 
be tackled at source. Over time liberalization and harmonization of ASEAN policy regimes 
should gradually whittle away distortions. In well-functioning economies industrial clustering 
occurs within proximity of hubs. Second- or third-best policy cross-border SEZs are a way of 
accommodating distortions not addressing them.  
In the Pacific Islands, the equivalent of the SEZs are the tourist resorts. There are no 
agglomerations of cheap labour and, because of the low volumes of cargo, there are no 
competitive sea and air freight rates compared with what is offered to business in PRC and 
Southeast Asia. Thus, SEZs cannot be expected to play a key role in the Pacific Islands. ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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Nevertheless, the preoccupation with SEZs has arguably distracted attention from the gross 
inefficiencies of the large cities with which they are linked or in which they are embedded. In 
many Asian cities the poor quality of infrastructure is the main obstacle to the movement of 
people and goods around the city and in and out of the metropolitan region, whether to the 
rest of the nation or to the wider region. And it is not just a matter of transport and 
communications. The interlocked problems of water supply, drainage and sewerage 
constitute a potentially catastrophic failure of public investment that may cause many coastal 
cities to become dysfunctional as global warming magnifies existing crises. Jakarta and 
Surabaya, Bangkok and Yangon are some of the most obvious examples. How to make 
national gateways more efficient is therefore an urban, a national, and a regional challenge.  
An interesting policy question is why some cities have established themselves as better 
gateway locations than others. Singapore; Hong Kong, China; and Shanghai, for example, 
have had much more success in developing critical infrastructure than Jakarta, Manila, or Ho 
Chi Minh City. The obvious answer is that Singapore and Hong Kong, China are rich, while 
Shanghai has mobilised massive funds for modernisation of its infrastructure. Other cities, by 
contrast, appear short of money and reliant upon capital flows, which are not necessarily 
attracted into social infrastructure. This lack of money is true only in a narrow sense. In all 
these countries the tax base is concentrated in the capital cities. In relative terms the 
problem is not the availability of funds but their distribution and allocation, as testified by 
booms in real estate and shopping malls. The challenge is one of mobilising funds from the 
local tax base for investment in large-scale projects. Although it is a somewhat trite 
observation: governance matters. Shanghai has risen to the challenge, as did Tokyo and 
Seoul at a time when Japan and the Republic of Korea were not yet prosperous countries. 
Other cities are hampered by weak urban governance and lack of concern—even 
indifference—from national governments. Endemic and worsening congestion, pollution, 
power failures, and flooding are the consequence.  
There is a well-grounded concern that the reallocation of scarce investment funds to very 
expensive urban infrastructure will further starve rural and up-country districts of much-
needed investment. This is the old argument of ‘urban bias’. In this context it is an unhelpful 
perspective because it suggests a false trade-off. A proper calculus of national investment 
priorities would suggest that more funds need to be spent on both urban and rural 
infrastructure. The modest amounts needed for most individual rural projects can potentially 
be funded from higher domestic taxation. The many billions of dollars required for urban 
infrastructure is a much greater challenge. While higher taxation of the urban rich and middle 
class offers part of the solution—those who will be the greatest beneficiaries of these 
investments can reasonably be expected to pay for them—large urban infrastructure projects 
also justify borrowing against the income stream of future generations, who will also be the 
beneficiaries. Here there are technical financial problems to be resolved, especially with 
regard to private investment. So far more success has been had in attracting private equity 
into power stations and water supply than into public transport, drainage, and sewerage 
projects. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The greatest and glaring inefficiency in the Asian-Pacific region is in the urban 
agglomerations that are the main locus of economic activity. Considerable care needs to 
taken to ensure that the new enthusiasm for land based infrastructure in cross-border 
regions is not at the expense of high-yielding investments in vital urban infrastructure 
(Roberts and Kanaley, 2006). In determining trade-offs there is a need to consider a door-to-
door logistics approach to all transport modes and seek to undertake the best calculus and 
ranking. There is a need to go beyond transport modes because cities are networks. 
Drainage networks have to be considered as they affect flooding and sewerage networks ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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concern health. As the efficiency of the city depends on more than transport links, it is 
important not to be too sectoral in approaching this task. 
These observations are most true of mega-cities like Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila but less 
so of small cities, sometimes little more than overgrown towns like Port Moresby, Suva and 
Nuku’alofa, the capitals of Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga, respectively National 
governments are often reluctant to undertake large infrastructure projects in transport, 
sewerage and drainage within cities, but catastrophic flooding will overwhelm smaller scale 
projects designed to resolve urban poverty issues (e.g., slum improvement schemes). While 
up-country and border regions need investment, by and large, the scale of project is modest 
(village and rural roads, telecommunications towers, small airports), which do not 
necessarily need international aid funds. Indeed, in those countries that are democracies 
there is a political process to deliver local infrastructure and it is perhaps the quality of 
governance that needs to be addressed rather than lack of local capital per se. Up-country 
areas should not have to wait for international agencies to solve their problems.  
There are also trade-offs between international and domestic projects. Within the Greater 
Mekong Subregion, the coastal highway between Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi would inter-mesh 
with transnational corridors. Similarly, the coastal tollway in Java and its extension into the 
Trans-Sumatra highway would benefit from some aid component of funding, even though not 
contributing directly to cross-border movements.  
As noted, the ‘national’ calculus for setting infrastructure priorities has obvious limitations, 
especially for small countries but also for the border regions and gateways of large 
countries. Conventional cost benefit calculus can underestimate the importance of cross-
border movements in ‘glueing’ multiple actors on different sides of the divide together and 
‘lubricating’ economic cooperation (Chen, 2006; Edmonds and Fujimura, 2008). Conversely, 
the ‘transnational’ calculus can also skew investment to cross-border movements at the 
expense of domestic needs. There is also a high risk that elevating the priority of 
infrastructure investment located adjacent to physical borders may accommodate temporary 
distortions in national policy regimes that will be more effectively addressed by intra-regional 
liberalization and harmonization. In the European Union where resources are allocated fairly 
efficiently between countries, one does not observe large economic agglomerations at 
national borders. Thus a cross-border focus may be too narrow. 
The vision explored here is designed to strengthen Asia’s competitive position in global 
commerce by creating reliable, efficient and secure connections between main urban 
gateways to permit both seamless and fast movement. This regional policy framework for 
strategic gateways and multimodal corridors will guide future actions (Bohunicky, 2007). 
Strategically located gateways and border crossings play a vital role in fostering international 
competitiveness. Support is needed for gateway strategies and multimodal corridors to 
enhance trade competitiveness and the development of a regional transport network. A 
system-based approach is required that tackles infrastructure, policy, governance and 
operational issues in an integrated public and private sector strategy. As evident from the 
contrasting studies of Mainland Southeast Asia, Island Southeast Asia and the Pacific 
Islands, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ package. 
What is needed is a policy that distinguishes main flows of goods, people and information 
from the actual contours and gradients of economic space and pays attention to door-to-door 
logistics movements. Where are the highest returns from investment in network 
infrastructure such as transport, telecommunications and sewerage? The best returns are 
likely to be derived from large infrastructure projects in the main cities (e.g. to combat 
flooding in Bangkok, Manila and Jakarta) and specific intra-city transport links (e.g. Trans-
Viet Nam and Trans-Java highways and railways). Given that there is no such thing as 
homogeneous economic space, attention should be should directed to the composition of 
flows through gateways and along corridors and identification of where the main obstacles, 
sometimes physical, and sometimes administrative, are to be found. It may be better to ADBI Working Paper 237    Rimmer and Dick 
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address the very real problems of congestion and pollution in urban areas to overcome 
externalities and bottlenecks than to spend a lot of money in improving or opening up lower 
density inter-city corridors to revitalize agriculture, small business and small cities and towns. 
In turn, SEZs are not a panacea but should be more closely aligned with the infrastructure 
development of the host cities to minimize the inefficiencies (e.g. congestion) as they impede 
the movement of people and goods. More specifically, there is the issue of how to determine 
priorities between modes in infrastructure development.  
Investment planned in 2008 looks to the post-Kyoto world beyond 2012. In the 10-15 years 
hence it has to be assumed that increasing scarcities of fossil fuels will result in higher fuel 
prices across Asia. This will shift the relative prices of transport modes. For example, small 
unit truckloads will become more expensive relative to consolidated shiploads. In other 
words, pending the design of more fuel-efficient engines, road transport will become more 
expensive relative to sea transport. Rail transport will also be favoured at the expense of 
road transport, suggesting that Viet Nam, and Java and Sumatra in Indonesia, less so the 
Philippines, could support more efficient rail networks. While it is difficult to substitute the 
role of pick-up and delivery trucks within urban areas, the costs of road traffic and 
congestion will rise markedly increasing the need for rail-based public transport (e.g. in 
Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh City). Although these observations hint at the direction of change 
occurring in modal split, this issue needs further in-depth investigation to help international 
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ANNEX: EXPLORING TRANS-ASIA NETWORKS  
An analysis is made of nodes or gateways, networks and hierarchies to indicate how Asia 
and the Pacific can be interconnected. At this stage the analysis is exploratory but should 
lead to a discussion of how nodes are identified, interconnected and weighted. 
A useful starting point is the long-term vision for an international integrated intermodal 
transport system for Asia and the Pacific provided by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (Ha, 2008). Designed to enhance the 
capacities for international trade by extending development opportunities to inland areas and 
landlocked countries, ESCAP’s vision of intermodal integration hinges on developing the 
Asian Highway and the Trans Asian Railway to extend the reach of seaports and the 
maritime network inland.   
A key element of the ESCAP plan involves the establishment of inland intermodal nodes at 
the intersection of highway and railway networks. These nodes can serve as dry ports at 
inland locations and are seen as providing the basis for establishing growth centres to attract 
manufacturing, agricultural processing and associated services. The nodes are examined 
here as a yardstick against which an alternative pattern of nodes can be compared before 
proceeding to examine networks and hierarchies 
 
Figure A1: ESCAP’s intermodal modes 
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Figure A2: Nodes in Asian Development Bank area of interest with populations over 2 
million and any national capitals below that threshold (UNS, 2008) 
 
 
Source: Rimmer, forthcoming 
 
 
Nodes or Gateways: ESCAP identifies 65 intermodal hubs; 50 within the Asian 
Development Bank’s are of interest and 15 in adjacent areas (Figure A3). Forty per cent of 
those within the ADB’s area are in Central Asia (Koide, 2007). Only 22 per cent of the hubs 




Table A1: Comparison of the location of ESCAP’S intermodal nodes and threshold 
nodes based on population and national capital status 
 ESCAP  Threshold  nodes
  Number  Per cent Number Per cent 
Central Asia  20  40  5  6 
South Asia  10  20  20  22 
Southeast Asia  9  18  12  13 
Northeast Asia  11  22  53  59 
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Figure A3: Minimal Spanning Tree Network linking nearest neighbor nodes 
 
 
Source: Rimmer, forthcoming 
 
 
Network:  A very different network to ESCAP’s intermodal patterns appears if we connect 
nearest neighbour nodes with populations over 2 million together with national capitals below 
this threshold; only Tashkent in Central Asia has a population above this threshold. Two arcs 
appear in the resultant minimal spanning tree connecting: (1) Northeast Asia through 
Southeast Asia and South Asia to Central Asia; and (2) Northeast Asia and Central Asia 
(Figure A3). 
 
Hierarchy: All nodes in the ESCAP vision have an equal weighting; no mention is made of 
airports. If weighting is applied based on the presence of the threshold cities in either the 
top-50 container ports or the top-50 cargo airports in 2005 a different pattern emerges (CI. 
2007; ACW, 2006). Twenty-five nodes are identified. Thirteen are ‘superhubs’ as they 
appear in both the port and airports lists; and seven appear only as ports and three only as 
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Figure A4: The hierarchy of nodes 
 
(Source: Rimmer, forthcoming) 
 
These explorations indicate that visions of integrated infrastructure development centred on 
nodes or gateways and covering all modes depend on thresholds, the rationale for 
connections and weightings. Ideally, these criteria should be augmented by data on flows of 
goods, people and information, and lead ultimately to the mapping of the nature of economic 
space. 